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PROFESSOR KATYAL:  Hello, everyone.  I want to thank all of you for 
coming today and for spending time with us today and tomorrow.  I want 
specifically to acknowledge the incredible work that our conference 
organizers have done.  Katherine Strandburg, Brett Frischmann, and Jay 
Kesan have done such a wonderful job in putting together this incredibly 
groundbreaking program, with so many interesting and wonderful papers 
and participants. 
Today I actually have the distinct honor of introducing someone who, 
quite literally, needs no introduction.  We have all read, cited, admired, and 
have been enriched by the person that I am about to introduce to you. 
 
* Her speech and essay are Copyright © 2009 by Wendy J. Gordon.  Permission is granted 
to make and distribute copies of her essay noncommercially provided this permission notice 
is preserved on all such copies.  In addition, of course, fair use remains available. 
** Wendy J. Gordon is the Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of 
Law.  During the period of revising the speech for publication, she served as the Bacon-
Kilkenny Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. 
  I owe great thanks to the participants at the Fordham conference.  Many of the points 
they raised in questions and comments have been incorporated into the essay you see before 
you.  I also apologize to those in the audience who wouldn’t describe themselves as I 
described the group; I probably overstated the unanimity within the audience.   
  I particularly want to thank Marc Poirier, Gregg Macey, Jeannie Fromer, Andrew 
Kull, and James Grimmelmann for stimulating discussion and providing helpful suggestions. 
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All of you know that Wendy Gordon is one of the most cited women in 
intellectual property today.  All of you also know that her work has brought 
us consistently to a new level of thinking in terms of blending the insights 
of philosophy, economics, and political theory into rethinking some of the 
foundational presumptions that explain the design and the enforcement of 
intellectual property.  Her article, Fair Use as Market Failure,1 which was 
on the Sony2 decision in the U.S. Supreme Court, ranks as one of the most 
cited articles in intellectual property history.  She has been cited in three 
Supreme Court opinions,3 and I am sure she has influenced dozens more in 
the process.4 
You also probably know that Wendy Gordon holds a distinguished chair 
at Boston University.  She has also served as a Fulbright Scholar, a fellow 
at Oxford, St. John’s College, a resident at the Rockefeller Foundation, and 
has received a New Jersey Governor’s Fellowship in the Humanities.  In the 
spring, we are delighted to have her with us here at Fordham. 
We know most of these incredible qualities and accomplishments, but 
perhaps one thing that we particularly want to draw attention to is 
something that so many of us in the room have benefited from. 
As most of you know, the law of intellectual property is a relatively new 
field.  It is populated by some extremely successful men and women who 
occupy very influential positions in the scholarly literature and also in the 
judiciary.  But one of the reasons why intellectual property as a discipline is 
so special is because of the hard work that our world of senior scholars and 
so many people in this room, like Pam Samuelson, Rochelle Dreyfuss, 
Jonathan Zittrain, Graeme Dinwoodie, Joel Reidenberg, Keith Aoki, Jay 
Kesan, Mike Madison—and there are so many others—have done in 
making sure that younger generations of scholars get mentored and 
supported and looked after as they develop. 
So while you may know Wendy Gordon’s incredible accomplishments, I 
want to draw your attention to some of the reasons why the world of 
intellectual property—and particularly because of her—is such a special 
and such a supportive field.  She has been referred to by Pam Samuelson as 
a pioneer in the field of intellectual property in many ways, including by 
bringing important insights from other disciplines to bear on fundamental 
issues in copyright law.  She draws not just from economics, but also from 
philosophy, art, literature, and psychology. 
 
 1. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
 2. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984). 
 3. N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 497 (2001); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559, 566 n.9 (1985); Sony, 464 U.S. at 478. 
 4. Wendy has been included in many “top citations” lists.  For example, James 
Lindgren and Donald Seltzer ranked Wendy as number five nationally on the list of “The 
Most Prolific Law Professors in the 10 and 20 Most-Cited Law Reviews (Volumes 
Beginning in 1988–1992) (Mean Pages).” James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most 
Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 17 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 781, 800 tbl.9 (1996). 
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“What exuberance,” Pam says, “she also brings to our field.  It makes 
copyright law that much more fun to have her with us.” 
Her dean, Maureen O’Rourke, has said of Wendy, “It has been a 
wonderful gift to be on the same faculty with Wendy Gordon,” and notes 
that Wendy is not only generous with her time, but has also served as a 
terrific mentor for junior faculty, both in the intellectual property field and 
outside. 
Feminist law professor and intellectual property maven Ann Bartow says, 
“In addition to being brilliant and funny, Wendy is also a truth teller.  She 
does not tell social lies to stroke egos.  She says exactly what she thinks, 
and that’s a great attribute in a person.”  Bartow explains, “She’s never 
mean, but she’s always direct and forthright.  For that reason, when she 
gives you a compliment, it really means something special.” 
If you have seen Wendy interact with her students or other scholars, or if 
you have seen her run down the hall after someone insisting that they wear 
a hat on a rainy day (which actually happened to me), you know precisely 
what I’m talking about.  You know how warm, how special, and how 
generous she can be with others. 
So I wanted to introduce Wendy not just by talking about her 
accomplishments, which we all know, but by emphasizing how much her 
time and generosity to others, on its own and by simply serving as an 
example, has really transformed the way that intellectual property scholars 
relate to one another. 
As Stacey Dogan from Northeastern explained to me,  
When I first met Wendy, I knew her only by her fearsome reputation as a 
copyright superstar.  The first couple of times I saw her at workshops, I 
sort of cowered.  Her comments seemed so intellectual and philosophical 
and robust and intimidating.  In fact, I don’t even think I dared to speak to 
her for several months after joining the Boston area intellectual property 
community.  But one day just out of the blue, she invited me to lunch.  I 
was surprised and delighted to find her warm, disarming, and eager to talk 
to me about my just-budding scholarly agenda.  Since then, I have had 
countless lunches with Wendy, working through her ideas and mine, 
shooting most of them down, but honing, developing, and strengthening 
many others. 
I just want to end with an observation:  what makes intellectual property 
law such a special field is precisely people like Wendy, people who spend 
time with junior folks working through intellectual property ideas and 
helping to develop them.  Jessica Silbey from Suffolk reminds us that, 
Wendy thoroughly engages with your work and she responds with a deep 
structural critique and genuine enthusiasm, both signs of respect.  For a 
junior scholar like myself, the attention Wendy provides is humbling.  
And because she knows no status in her comments or attention, anyone 
can be the beneficiary of it.  In this way, she is a true intellectual, but she 
is also a model citizen. 
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I want to draw attention to this aspect of Wendy’s work because, in the 
eyes of myself and so many others here, that is what makes her special, and 
it is what makes intellectual property law as a field so special—that she 
knows no status in her comments or attention, as Jessica says, and that is 
what makes not just a true intellectual, but also a model citizen for us to 
follow. 
Let’s all give a warm welcome to the charming, humble, and inestimably 
generous Wendy Gordon, and thank her for sharing her views with us. 
PROFESSOR GORDON:  That was actually the kindest, nicest 
introduction anyone has given for me in my entire life.  Thank you so 
much, Sonia. 
I also want to thank Bill Treanor and Joel Reidenberg as our hosts, and to 
thank Kathy Strandburg, Brett Frischmann, and Jay Kesan for putting this 
excellent conference together.  I also thank this morning’s panelists for 
what I have already learned today, and I look forward to the rest of the 
conference. 
 
HARMLESS USE: 
GLEANING FROM FIELDS OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS 
I will first provide a brief comment about what I think brings us all 
together.  Second, I will talk about a particular project—something that has 
preoccupied me ever since I entered the field—namely, the distinction 
between what I will call, for sake of abbreviation, harmful use and harmless 
use. 
I.  OUR COMMUNITY 
Now to my first task.  One of the interests that unify many of the scholars 
in this room is a curiosity about noncommercial models such as cooperative 
sharing and peer-to-peer creativity.  Motivating this curiosity might be a 
yearning for a different kind of society, perhaps one that is less commercial, 
more focused on dialogues, both democratic and personal, and a mode of 
life that emphasizes the process and product of work rather than its 
monetary payoff. 
We all know from the work of psychologists like Teresa Amabile5 and 
education experts like Alfie Kohn,6 as well as from our own experience, 
 
 5. See, e.g., TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT:  UPDATE TO THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 149–52, 157–60 (1996) (finding that individuals promised a 
reward for drawing produced more drawings than students not so motivated, but that the 
“reward” group’s drawings were of lesser quality than the artwork produced spontaneously 
by the control group). 
 6. See, e.g., ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS?:  THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD STARS, 
INCENTIVE PLANS, A’S, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES (1993). 
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that unprodded work is often the best work.  External motivators, whether 
sticks or carrots, can get in the way. 
Sticks are probably the most destructive—think back to the quality of 
work you produced for a parent who threatened to ground you unless you 
finished your school project.  But even carrots—promises of reward—can 
be destructive.  If an individual is keeping his or her eye on a monetary goal 
or getting an A or getting ahead, instead of on the intrinsic interest of the 
work itself, very often he or she will do work less good than what he or she 
produces on those occasions when the work itself is the focus of attention.7  
To what extent can the law help make the work itself the focus of creative 
people’s attention, without denying them the recompense that the authors 
both need in order to keep creating, and deserve?  It is that dilemma, I think, 
that many of us are trying to reconcile—we are seeking a sort of life and 
law that de-emphasizes the commercial yet still provides some of the 
benefits the commercial structure gives. 
We are all exploring alternatives, and our paths are many.  Some see 
these new patterns in IP scholarship as reaching critical momentum when 
Jessica Litman issued her invitation to see the public domain as more than a 
default category8 and to see the legislative version of copyright as a product 
of less-than-reasoned decision making.9  Those are my particular 
landmarks.  Others might attribute the takeoff point to Pam Samuelson, 
particularly the conference on copyright and computers at Columbia that 
she was key in organizing,10 or maybe Becky Eisenberg’s11 work on 
sharing in science, or Larry Lessig’s unparalleled ability to bring copyright 
issues to a popular audience,12 or Yochai Benkler’s work on networks,13 or 
Lewis Hyde’s book on how gift relationships foster creativity.14 
Whomever we nominate as our person who marked the shift—half the 
people in this room come to mind as candidates; and one prime candidate 
for the role of triggering the shift is not even a person, it is the Internet—we 
come to a place where we look toward a similar set of goals but from a 
thousand different angles. 
We may resemble the group of blind men in the old joke, each of whom 
touches part of an elephant and experiences something quite unlike what the 
others report perceiving.  But although individually we might not be able to 
 
 7. See generally AMABILE, supra note 5; KOHN, supra note 6. 
 8. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1012–22 (1990). 
 9. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001). 
 10. Symposium, Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
2307 (1994). 
 11. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J 177 (1987). 
 12. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004), available at 
http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf. 
 13. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). 
 14. LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT:  IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (3d ed. 
1983). 
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get a full mental picture of the elephant, together in pooling our 
observations we might figure out what is what.  That is what the community 
of scholars hopes to do in all cases—join together in a common inquiry—
but does particularly well and particularly eagerly in our field. 
So many of the current projects, including the commons project by the 
tri-wizard15 team of Kathy, Brett, and Mike,16 explicitly say that they are 
looking for contributions, trying to build models, and drawing people 
together to compare what works and what does not work.17 
In addition to this active seeking of cooperation, another noteworthy 
development is the way in which new institutions to assist the public in 
dealing with copyright are being formed.  I guess it probably began with 
Richard Stallman, the programmer famous for writing the GNU Emacs text 
editor, which provides the winged feet of the GNU/LINUX system.18  He 
founded the free software movement and created “copyleft”—a mode of 
using copyright to enforce liberty of access—and instantiated it in the 
General Public License (GPL).19  Since then, we have seen “Creative 
Commons” begin and grow.  We witnessed Larry Lessig’s noble if futile 
effort to challenge copyright’s most recent durational extension.20  There is 
a wonderful new set of standards for fair use for documentary filmmakers 
that Peter Jaszi and Pat Aufderheide put together,21 which is inspiring 
others as well.22  We see follow-on efforts by people all over the country.23 
 
 15. Hogwarts and its “Tri-Wizard Tournament” are probably trademarks, but my use is 
lawful.  (Yes, this is a wise-guy footnote.)  For an interesting take on the real legal issues 
involved in employing trademarked terms in nonsales contexts, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark 
A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 
1345, 1349 (2008) (arguing that trademark owners should not be able to use the Lanham Act 
to restrain nontrademark use of their terms and symbols). 
 16. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-26, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265793. 
 17. See id. at 1–2. 
 18. See, e.g., Posting of Paul McNamara to Network World, 
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/25360 (Feb. 25, 2008, 07:56 EST) 
(discussing Richard Stallman’s role as the creator of the GNU Emacs text editor).  
 19. The General Public License (GPL) uses copyright to enforce openness; thus, its 
nickname is “copyleft.”  Roughly speaking it works like this:  programmers who make their 
work available under the GPL retain their copyrights, but give anyone permission to copy, 
sell, and adapt their programs—so long as the persons doing so also (1) make available their 
(human-readable) source code instead of merely distributing impossible-to-decipher 
(machine-readable) object code; and (2) employ copyleft in their resulting product by 
including in them the GPL set of permissions and requirements. See generally GNU Project, 
The General Public License, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last visited Mar. 23, 
2009). 
 20. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003) (noting that Lawrence Lessig 
argued on behalf of the petitioners). 
 21. E.g., ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, 
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), available 
at http://centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/bestpractices.pdf; see also PATRICIA 
AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES:  CREATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 30–
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In other words, some in the community are trying now not only to help 
lawyers, judges, and legislators think through how to do their work, but are 
also trying to directly assist ordinary people in how they do their daily 
business.  And that is a very exciting new dimension for legal scholarship 
generally. 
Enough panegyric.  I promised that in this speech I would also try to 
provide our community with an extra analytic tool.  As you will recall, my 
offering is to suggest why it would be valuable to put more focus on the 
harmless use of copyrighted works.   
II.  HARMFUL AND HARMLESS USES 
There are differences between, on the one hand, interactions that cause 
substantial harm to the plaintiff, and, on the other hand, harmless 
interactions that trigger disputes only because the parties disagree about 
how to allocate shares in the benefit they have mutually generated.  These 
differences deserve greater attention. 
In his talk this morning, James Grimmelmann suggested that there may 
be an opposition between the ethic of sharing and the ethic of trade.24  I am 
not so sure.  Both ethics involve reciprocity;25 after all, one never knows 
when he or she will be the stranger in need rather than the owner who 
shares.  In copyright this is particularly true.  As many observers have 
noted, a kind of reciprocity is inherent in the authorial role:  authors are 
continually both creators of original work and users of material others have 
created.26  Nevertheless, if James is correct that there is a conflict between 
the ethic of trade and the ethic of sharing, that conflict is softest when the 
 
32 (2004), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES 
_Report.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g., Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, Freedom 
to Teach:  An Educational Fair Use Project, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research 
/freedomtoteach# (last visited Mar. 23, 2009). 
 23. And, of course, the professorial contribution is only a small part of a larger 
movement that includes advocacy groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
and many forms of community action. 
 24. James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2005 (2009). See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora’s Amphora:  The Ambiguity of 
Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815 (1999) (arguing that the institution of contract is more 
egalitarian than the institution of gift). 
 25. The authors who have written on reciprocity are legion.  One wonderful place to 
begin is with philosopher and polymath Lawrence Becker’s book Reciprocity. LAWRENCE C. 
BECKER, RECIPROCITY (1986).  For a recent exploration of reciprocity’s limits, see Ronald J. 
Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation:  Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304283.  On the behavioral literature regarding 
reciprocity, see sources collected id. at 64 n.136. 
 26. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 8, at 966.  This duality of position is also recognized by 
economists such as William Landes and Richard Posner, who point out that increases in 
copyright protection today benefit a current generation of creators but add to the costs of 
creation that will be faced by the next generation. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11, 69 (2003). 
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thing we ask the owner to share is something he wasn’t using anyway,27 or 
something that, if used by a stranger, would cause the owner no substantial 
harm.  The latter is my focus. 
A.  Gleaning 
You may know the old saying that condemns the person who “reap[s] 
where he has not sown.”28  Taken literally, the phrase is a condemnation of 
 
 27. It is often believed that a copyright or patent owner’s rights to exclude remain strong 
even if the owner refuses to use or license the intangible.  (I call this the question of whether 
proprietors have a “right not to use” their writings and inventions.)  But the most cited case 
for the “right not to use” in copyright—Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932)—was 
a tax case focusing on other issues, namely, whether a copyright is an “instrumentalit[y] of 
the federal government” and hence immune from state taxation. Id. at 126–28.  I see the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s statement about the copyright owner’s freedom not to use in Doyal as 
essentially dicta, or, at most, directed at the owner’s freedom not to use even in the face of a 
federal government demand.  The Doyal decision does not address whether an owner’s 
decision not to use her property should affect the rights of private parties to glean. 
  The Supreme Court has made clear that, at least in some contexts, a refusal to use or 
license will increase the defendant’s liberty under the fair use doctrine; this is true 
particularly in markets (such as the “market” for criticism and parody) that the copyright 
owner does not want to exploit. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  Some 
older cases also indicate that the public had some rights to share in unused intellectual 
products. See, e.g., Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisc. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 
941, 945–46 (9th Cir. 1945) (dicta) (patentee’s refusal to license vitamin-enriching process 
for oleomargarine, “the butter of the poor,” might justify denying injunction against patent 
infringement). 
  Admittedly, sometimes an owner’s nonuse of her property lacks this effect. Thus, 
commentators and courts often cite Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378–79 
(1945), which stated that a patentee is free not to use, and to suppress, his or her patent.  Yet 
that statement in Coe was mere dicta; the Coe Court also noted that, “The record establishes 
no intention by petitioner not to use his invention.” Id. at 380. 
  Nonuse by an owner sometimes even works to constrict a defendant’s liberty of use.  
Thus, in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), the Court 
weighed the unused (unpublished) nature of the plaintiff’s work heavily against the 
defendant’s fair use claim.  Note, however, that in Harper & Row the plaintiff had plans to 
publish the work almost immediately, so that the decision was about the copyright owner’s 
control of “timing” his use, not about judicial reactions to nonuse.  Further, when a slim 
majority of Supreme Court Justices strongly deferred to the unpublished nature of a work in 
Harper & Row, Congress rebuffed them by revising § 107 to state that the unpublished 
nature of a work did not itself negate the public’s ability to make fair use of it. 17 U.S.C. § 
107 (2006).  
  Some may wonder how the Supreme Court can square, on the one hand, the Acuff-
Rose opinion’s seeming disdain for an owner’s desire not to award licenses to parodists, 
with, on the other hand, standard judicial deference to owners’ “customary” commercial 
decisions to refuse licenses based on ordinary marketing and timing criteria.  For an example 
of the latter, see not only Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, but also more recent cases such as 
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, 150 F.3d 132 (1998) 
(distinguishing usual and customary markets from “fair use markets”).  I proffer what E. J. 
Mishan called “welfare effects” as one criterion for distinguishing between, on the one hand, 
cases where the courts are willing to defer to an owner’s decision not to use, and, on the 
other hand, the cases where the courts are unwilling to give weight to markets the owner 
leaves unused. See the discussion of pricelessness and welfare effects in Wendy J. Gordon, 
Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:  Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part 
of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 182–87 (2003); E. J. Mishan, The Postwar 
Literature on Externalities:  An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 18–19 (1971). 
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ever keeping a windfall or a beneficial spillover or perhaps even an 
inheritance.  So interpreted, following the phrase’s advice would be insane; 
in a civilized nation full of physical, technological, and cultural 
infrastructure, we reap from birth what others have sown.  Nevertheless, the 
broad condemnation of “reaping without sowing” seems to find its way into 
a substantial amount of judicial decisions and public debate.  To help 
people remember why the seeming command, “do not reap where you 
haven’t sown,” should not and cannot be taken to broadly condemn free 
riding, let me take two examples from the past.  One is the Biblical practice 
of gleaning.  Gleaning served the community in both of the ways that 
concerned James Grimmelmann in his discussion this morning.29  Gleaning 
honored the trading ethic by allowing a farmer his primary harvest, and 
honored the sharing ethic by endowing the poor with an entitlement to food. 
Although the agricultural metaphor30 of reap/sow is sometimes thought 
to have a biblical origin, the Five Books of Moses do not condemn the 
substantially harmless reaping of another’s harvest.  To the contrary:  if a 
Jew owned a field, at harvest time he or she was commanded to leave some 
grain standing in the corners for the people who were poor, and the latter 
were supposed to come and glean.  Biblically, then, part of the property 
owner’s obligation was to sow without reaping every product of the field; 
conversely, to reap without sowing is a right of both the stranger and the 
community.31 
Seventeen years ago, I argued for limits on IP rights32 based in part on a 
gleaning argument.  I wrote, “The remote beneficiary who makes an 
unexpected and creative use of the work arguably does not reap the 
plaintiff’s harvest.  At most, she gleans in a neglected corner of the field, 
and by gleaning Ruth met Boaz.”33 
 
 28. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967); Int’l News Serv. 
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (2005) (quoting KAPLAN, supra, at 
2). 
 29. Grimmelmann, supra note 24. 
 30. I am not sure who first called it “the agricultural metaphor”; it was probably Ben 
Kaplan. 
 31. Joseph Singer translates the applicable Torah passage this way:   
When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap all the way to the edges 
of your field, or gather the gleanings of your harvest.  You shall not pick your 
vineyard bare, or gather the fallen fruit of your vineyard; you shall leave them for 
the poor and the stranger:  I am the Lord your God.  
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD:  LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
OWNERSHIP, at frontispiece (2000) (translating Leviticus 19:9); see also id. at 38–62 
(discussing the practice of gleaning and other property-sharing institutions in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam). 
 32.  Most people see “IP rights” and think “intellectual property rights.”  However, I 
think “intellectual property” is a term that perniciously misdescribes our field.  I therefore 
use “IP” to stand for “intangible products.” 
 33. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 191–92 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Restitutionary Impulse]. 
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I thought that “Ruth met Boaz” was the capper to the argument.  But it 
turned out no one knew who they were.  So let me tell you.  Ruth was a 
poor woman who gleaned in a field owned by Boaz.  The two married and 
became the grandparents of King David.  From King David’s line 
supposedly sprang Joseph, husband of Mary; it is sometimes argued that 
Mary was also a descendant.34  As two important traditions, Jewish and 
Christian, both ascribe great importance to the lineage of Ruth and Boaz, 
the meeting of those two people during gleaning provides a wonderful 
image to underscore the fecundity that can flow from allowing some 
reaping without sowing. 
So the Bible rejects a rule that would forbid all “reaping without 
sowing.”  Industries engaged in anticopying public campaigns might preach 
to potential copyists the commandment that “Thou Shalt Not Steal,” but the 
Bible makes clear that reaping without sowing need not constitute theft. 
B.  A Different Perspective on INS v. AP 
Let me now essay a differently angled attack.  I want to look at the most 
famous American application of the agricultural metaphor:  the Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion in International News Service v. Associated Press 
(INS).35  In that 1918 case, the Supreme Court of the United States enjoined 
one news service (that had been barred from the European theater of war) 
from copying the other news service’s published news.36  I will try to show 
how that case is all about harm. 
In most of the cases where the “reap without sowing” command has been 
recognized, like INS, the situation isn’t simply one where the defendant has 
benefited without paying.  Rather, the benefit is taken at the expense of the 
plaintiff.37  For the reaping to be condemned, it usually must be harmful, 
 
 34. See, e.g., John Gill’s Exposition of the Entire Bible, 
http://www.freegrace.net/gill/Luke/Luke_3.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (commenting on 
Luke 3:23:  “Which was the son of Eli; meaning, not that Joseph was the son of Eli; for he 
was the son of Jacob, according to [Matthew] 1:16, but Jesus was the son of Eli; and which 
must be understood, and carried through the whole genealogy . . . though it is true indeed 
that Joseph was the son of Eli, having married his daughter; Mary was the daughter of 
Eli . . . .”).  Wikipedia explains John Gill’s position this way:  “Gill (theologian), for 
example, claimed that Matthew’s gospel gives Jesus’ legal lineage through Joseph while 
Luke gives Jesus’ biological lineage through Mary.” Wikipedia.org, Genealogy of Jesus, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancestors_of_Christ (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 35. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 36. Id. at 245. 
 37. This may have been true even in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 
456 N.E.2d 84, 92–93 (Ill. 1983).  In that case, the Supreme Court of Illinois used the state 
law of misappropriation to enjoin the offerors of a futures contract from pegging their “index 
price” (of stock market performance) to the Dow Jones average.  The court’s decision was 
shocking, in part because it ignored federal preemption, but also because the use planned by 
the defendant was apparently both productive and harmless.  Yet the judicial urge to avoid 
harm probably paid a role:  I suspect that the result was dictated by the court’s fear that if the 
defendant prevailed, the aura of “gambling” sometimes attributed to commodities trading 
would stick to Dow Jones, publisher of the Wall Street Journal, and harm the reputation of 
that conservative entity. 
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usually not only to the plaintiff, but to the society as a whole.  This was 
clearly recognized in the Motorola case, where the Second Circuit said that 
it would save a hot-news misappropriation claim from preemption only 
when the defendant’s actions were so harmful that they threatened to leave 
the public without the service.38 
 To illustrate how important the harm element is to these cases that 
purport to be about reaping and sowing, then, I would like to talk about an 
aspect of the INS case that I have taught to my classes for years, but have 
seen no hint of in print until fairly recently, in Douglas Baird’s wonderful 
recounting of the litigation’s background.39  First, though, the more familiar 
story. 
Many of us have noticed that, in INS, the majority opinion says that the 
law should stop INS from copying AP’s news because INS was doing its 
copying “precisely at the point where profit [was] to be reaped.”40  If the 
copyist was allowed to continue and expand its practice of copying without 
remuneration, the company that had the only front-line access to war news 
could have collapsed, leaving the copyist without anyone to copy and 
unable to engage in war reportage itself because of European rules that 
uniquely constrained it; and the public would have been left without first-
hand reportage of World War I.41  Thus, the INS story mimics a prisoner’s 
dilemma in many ways; if both parties fail to cooperate with each other, 
they both suffer.42 
But this argument was far from watertight, of course.  As with all 
prisoner’s dilemmas, disaster is not inevitable.  Among other possibilities, 
had the Court denied AP the relief it sought against INS, the two news-
 
 38. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).  The court 
listed three elements: 
We therefore find the extra elements—those in addition to the elements of 
copyright infringement—that allow a “hot-news” claim to survive preemption are:  
(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a 
defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or service 
provided by the plaintiff. 
Id. at 853 (dicta). 
  National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.’s dicta might conceivably be 
interpreted as allowing a hot-news claim where only the first two elements are present.  The 
interpretation of International News Service v. Associated Press (INS), 248 U.S. 215, urged 
infra, an interpretation that focuses on the two news services’ relations with their customers 
rather than with each other, will, I think, make clearer why that third element is crucial to the 
“hot-news” precedent.  Of course, the preemption issue raises additional complications; it is 
possible that the court was incorrect, and that the federal law might preempt even a state 
claim that contained all three elements. 
 39. Douglas G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES:  
PROPERTY, NATURAL MONOPOLY, AND THE UNEASY LEGACY OF A CONCOCTED CONTROVERSY 
9, 9–35 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
 40. INS, 248 U.S. at 240. 
 41. See, e.g., Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, at 266–73 (discussing 
misuses of the INS case). 
 42. Id. at 267–68. 
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gathering entities could have entered into a “gentlemen’s agreement”43 
about what was acceptable practice, using their prospect of iterated 
transactions as a way to keep each other disciplined. 
Yet a defendant’s victory in INS would have threatened a harm beyond 
what was identified in this now-standard story, however—a harm that 
would have been much more obvious, immediate, and, I think, 
irremediable.  This would have been the harm to each organization’s 
internal structure.44  I suggest that we expand our attention from the biparty 
relationship between AP and INS, to the multilevel relationship each entity 
had to its respective members and customers, the local newspapers.45 
If you publish the New Haven Register or the Hartford Courant, you 
probably can’t afford your own international or even nonlocal reporters.  So 
you pay money to a news service like the AP.  The news service gathers the 
money from you and other similarly situated newspapers, hires international 
and national correspondents,46 and makes the resulting news stories 
available to you. 
But how likely are you, local newspaper publisher, to pay fees to a news 
service if you know you can copy their news for free?  That is an important 
question, because if INS had gone the other way, that is, had the Court 
denied AP the relief against copying that it sought, most lawyers of the day 
would probably assume that newspapers could copy news freely. 
(Admittedly, copyright law could still make the small newspapers rewrite 
the news stories so as to avoid taking expression, but, if the dissent had 
prevailed in INS, any newspaper would be free to copy all the facts it 
wished to.)47  In such a context, the hometown newspaper would just drop 
 
 43. However, Douglas Baird shows that the two news organizations were not situated on 
an equal playing field. See Baird, supra note 39, at 24–25.  AP was much more powerful; 
among other things it had exclusive cartel arrangements with foreign governments to obtain 
news. Id. at 25.  Nevertheless, some kind of agreement might have been forthcoming (pace 
antitrust, of course), particularly since, as Baird points out, “the most important member of 
AP,” id. at 26, and the owner of INS, id. at 29, was the same person:  William Randolph 
Hearst.   
 44.  Baird suggests that there was no real dispute between INS and AP to be resolved—
whether by agreement or litigation. Id. at 35.  The effective head of AP, Kent Cooper, 
“understood that the victory had little to do with INS and everything to do with his vision of 
AP’s future.” Id. at 30.  By this, I think Baird is referring to the possibility I mention in text 
immediately below, namely, that without a rule against copying news, AP newspapers might 
have defected, and future customers (such as radio stations, id. at 31) might not have signed 
on. 
 45. Baird does a wonderful job of providing such background. See generally id.  My 
version is much simplified. 
 46.  Although AP’s initial strength lay in its technical infrastructure—“leasing the 
telegraph lines and hiring telegraph operators,” id. at 13—and not in gathering news, by the 
time of the litigation, it had begun serious news-gathering efforts. Id. at 19. 
 47.  In the litigated case, INS apparently asserted no copyright in the news. Int’l News 
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 232–33 (1918).  In 1918, rigid legal formalities 
made it awkward and difficult to obtain copyright for works such as newspapers. Baird, 
supra note 39, at 12.  Even if INS had claimed copyright in its news stories, copyright does 
not extend to facts. INS, 248 U.S. at 234. 
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its news-service membership or subscription.  That would be particularly 
true of the West Coast papers, which, because of the earth’s rotation, would 
even get pre-daybreak access to the news printed in East Coast morning 
papers. 
The Court might reasonably have thought that if it refused to enjoin the 
defendant’s copying, no entity could collect enough fees from the small 
newspapers to afford to send out national and overseas correspondents.  
This could drastically impair the knowledge base upon which democracy 
rests.  If the Court had such a prospect in mind, it might well have thought 
it proper to stop that kind of copying.48 
So, in INS, for all of its dicta about refraining from “reap[ing] where 
[you] ha[ve] not sown,”49 the more applicable rule seems to be, you can’t 
“reap” if using the product of others’ intelligence and effort is going to be 
so harmful to them as to make it impossible to get an important product to 
the public.50  Thus, if you look at the granddaddy of the “reap without 
sowing” cases, it is not about prohibiting somebody like Ruth from taking 
some grain she did not plant; it is about prohibiting a whole crowd from 
taking the entire field of grain. 
C.  Exploring a Provisional Rule 
So far we seem to have a provisional rule—still untested, since this is just 
a thought experiment51—but the rule looks like this:  the law should not 
permit suit for “reaping without sowing” except where the reaping causes 
substantial harm to the plaintiff and the public.  In my thought experiment, I 
would extend this rule to both common-law causes of action such as right of 
publicity and misappropriation (to the extent, if any, these state rights 
survive preemption) and to copyright itself. 
This would mean drastically fewer lawsuits.  That may not be a bad 
thing.  After all, back in the early morning of law and economics, Judge 
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed suggested that, all things being 
 
  The public domain status of facts under copyright law is even clearer today than it 
was in the very early twentieth century; prior to Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340 (1991), and the 
enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), courts occasionally stretched to “protect” laboriously 
gathered facts under copyright in one way or another.  (Truth be told, even today, some 
copyright courts come close to protecting bare facts.) 
 48. Justice Louis Brandeis’s dissenting opinion made clear that, whether or not the 
prohibition of copying facts was wise, such a ruling should have been left to the legislature, 
which, in detailed provisions or administrative regulations, could have protected the free 
speech and antitrust issues so raised. INS, 248 U.S. at 264–67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  A 
simple injunction in favor of AP could have left many newspaper readers without news of 
the war.  As it happens, however, Baird argues, the injunction made little difference to the 
behavior of INS. Baird, supra note 39, at 30. 
 49. INS, 248 U.S. at 239. 
 50. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 51.  I am far from having resolved all relevant issues, especially regarding remedial 
questions.  For example, in this essay, I suggest that profitable commercial adapters of 
copyrighted work must pay; should non-profitable adapters be free of any obligations?  For 
one earlier take on the topic, see Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, at 258–66. 
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equal, the cheapest thing to do with injuries is to let them lie where they 
fall.52  Of course, they knew that not all things are equal—often letting 
injuries lie where they fall means long-term social loss because injurers will 
have no incentive to avoid careless behavior.  Nevertheless, that starting 
observation of theirs may have identified one reason plaintiffs have the 
burden of proof; in cases of deadlock, the damage remains with the 
defendant, where it already lies.   
 The economic insight known as “moral hazard”53 has even more 
importance than does avoidance of administrative costs.  Since in any 
interaction both parties play a role (as Saul Levmore says, it “takes two to 
tort”54), by leaving losses on defendants, people in defendants’ position will 
have incentives to take more care in the future. 
A similar set of observations might be made, in converse,55 about copyright.   
 
 52. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 n.43 (1972). 
 53. “Moral hazard” points out that people who are fully assured of reimbursement in 
case of loss will be more careless than if they expected to bear part or all of the potential 
losses themselves.  
 54. Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 771, 822 (1982) (citing R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960)). 
 55. Let me make clear some of the ways in which negligence law mirrors copyright 
and vice versa.  Any mirror produces data points that are identical but reversed; it is 
therefore sometimes difficult to keep the relationships between mirrored structures in 
mind.  Here are the major mirrored structures: 
• Negligence law is primarily concerned with internalizing harms, while 
copyright is primarily concerned with internalizing benefits. 
• Negligence law seeks to decrease socially destructive behavior, while 
copyright seeks to increase socially productive behavior. 
• Most of negligence law aims its primary incentives toward defendants 
and those upon whose behavior the defendants have some influence 
(such as careless employees).  Conversely, copyright aims most of its 
incentives toward plaintiffs and those over whose behavior the plaintiffs 
have some influence (such as creative employees, or authors to whom 
publishers as copyright assignees pay royalties). 
o Thus, the rules of negligence law are crafted for the primary 
purpose of decreasing the careless or otherwise undesirable 
behavior of defendants (or their employees). 
o Conversely, copyright law is crafted for the primary purpose of 
increasing the socially desirable production of creative works 
by plaintiffs (or their creative employees and assignors) 
• Both copyright and negligence law have some concern with the 
incentives of the other party as well.   
o For tort law, this concern primarily embodies itself in defenses.  
For copyright law, this concern primarily embodies itself in 
limitations to the plaintiff’s rights. 
? Thus, the tort doctrines of assumption of risk and 
contributory or comparative negligence seek to 
minimize the so-called “moral hazard” that plaintiffs 
will take inadequate precautions to avoid injury; 
these tort doctrines, therefore, leave harm on some 
plaintiffs to encourage other people in plaintiff’s 
position to take appropriate precautions.   
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The cheapest thing to do, administratively, is to allow beneficial spillovers 
to lie where they happen to fall.  And when people in the recipient 
(defendant) position are doing no harm, and are capable of creating new 
works and benefits of their own, maybe leaving gains on recipients will 
encourage people in defendants’ position to build productively on what they 
have received. 
Just as moral hazard tells us that defendants who are fully immunized 
from harm might be careless, the converse is also true:  defendants who are 
fully excluded from spillover benefits may be unproductive.  And given that 
intangibles are often best exploited by decentralized, spontaneous 
outpourings of effort,56 particularly in the copyright arena,57 assuring some 
return and thus incentives to downstream users is particularly important.58 
 
? As for copyright, the converse encouragement for 
defendants can be found in many doctrines that limit 
the plaintiff’s rights, such as the “idea/expression 
dichotomy,” the limitation of the right to control 
performance to only “public” performance, overall 
durational limits,  plus a host of specific exceptions 
such as the first sale doctrine.  All these consistently 
leave some benefits with defendants to encourage 
them to build on predecessor works. 
o The policy concern with the incentives of the “other party” 
sometimes switches locus without substantially changing its 
effect.  Foreseeability is a good if controversial example. 
? The tort of negligence puts a burden on the plaintiff 
to prove that the harm done was foreseeable to a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position. 
? Copyright in the “fair use doctrine” encourages 
defendants to show that their use causes no 
significant harm to markets that the plaintiff 
expected to exploit.  That is, the defendant might try 
to show that if his use has any negative impact, it 
affects only markets unforeseeable to plaintiffs. 
On the latter point, see Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007), who argues that foreseeability has played a strong historic 
role in fair use that needs to be reasserted more strongly today; also see Wendy J. Gordon, 
Foreseeability and the Harm/Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. [hereinafter Gordon, 
Harm/Benefit Distinction] (forthcoming 2009) (arguing that foreseeability does play a role in 
fair use, and explaining why negligence law is a more apt model for copyright infringement 
than is trespass-to-land); also see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright 
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117655 (arguing that copyright law be revised to require proof of 
foreseeability as an element of plaintiff’s case).   
  On the general question of tort/copyright parallels, see generally Wendy J. Gordon, 
Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image:  “Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of 
Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003). 
 56. There is a substantial literature arguing the opposite, of course. See, e.g., Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (the most 
famous and probably first enunciation of the “prospect theory” favoring centralization of 
control).  But the argument for centralization is probably stronger for patent than for 
copyright. See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods:  Trading Gold for 
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 170 n.38 (2002) (“[T]he centralization argument [of the 
prospect theory] has little force when applied to copyright, a field whose merit is diversity 
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Thus, the “permissible gleaning” rule has many purposes.  Among other 
things, the rule aims to avoid interfering with the defendant’s own creative 
processes, to preserve the defendant’s incentives to build on what came 
before, to help the owner execute a moral duty to allow gleaning, and to do 
all this without losing basic authorial rewards.  Since the “gleaning” rule 
does not forbid suit where harm is done, it preserves the basic incentives 
and expectations of those who are potential plaintiffs. 
Yet I remain concerned that this gleaning rule may not provide enough 
for the creative class; it might underincentivize plaintiffs in a random way.  
To correct this, I suggest limiting the permissible-gleaning rule.  Among 
other things,59 I would allow a plaintiff to sue for license fees for a 
substantially harmless use when the defendant is making a use-yielding 
profit60 sufficient to leave both parties with benefits, so long as asking 
advance permission for use would not interfere with the defendant’s 
creative process.  Under this approach, if a large-scale enterprise, like a 
movie, made extensive use of a copyrighted work without permission, it 
would be suable for a share of its profits, even if the work on which the 
movie was based lost no sales as a result of its adaptation into movie form.  
This limitation on the “go and glean” rule is explored further infra Part II.F. 
 
rather than centralization.”).  For helpful discussion, see Henry E. Smith, Intellectual 
Property as Property:  Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007). 
 57. Paul Goldstein in his treatise argues the primary purpose of copyright is to induce 
great variety in works. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 1 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (3rd ed. 
2006). 
 58.  As a corollary, I would argue that 17 U.S.C. § 103 should be revised to allow 
copyright in any creative derivative work, regardless of whether the author of the derivative 
work employed the prior work lawfully.  (This change would make copyright follow the 
current pattern in patent law.)  Under copyright’s current § 103(a), any creativity that is 
“intermixed” with unlawful use loses its copyright, so that, for example, the author of an 
unauthorized translation would not only be subject to an infringement suit, but the copyright 
owner of the translated book could publish the new translation and owe nothing to the 
translator.  This impairs the translator’s incentives.  Note that even if § 103 were revised as I 
suggest, the first author still has leverage to obtain his own payments:  the author of the 
creative derivative work could not do much with the work—could not publish it, publicly 
perform it, etc.—unless he had fair use, or had the consent of the person owning copyright in 
the work upon which the derivative was built.  My change would give the derivative’s author 
more bargaining leverage than he has under current law.  
  Admittedly, the authors of unlawfully made derivative works have some bargaining 
power now, not only because the preparation of the work might be sheltered by the fair use 
doctrine (cf. patent’s experimental use exception), but also because the statute deprives the 
derivative author of copyright only in that “part of the work in which such material has been 
used unlawfully.” 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  Yet some judges have gone 
so far as to hint (contrary to legislative history and statutory language) that any unlawful use 
taints the whole derivative work so that even separable portions of the latter cannot bear their 
own copyright. Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir. 2000).  It would be better to 
amend § 103(a) to follow the patent model and allow even the unauthorized maker of a 
derivative work her copyright.  Then, if the derivative work is valuable, both the author of 
the derivative work and the author of the work on which it is based can profit. 
 59. In addition, as will appear below, I would allow suit over a substantially harmless 
use for the purpose of trying title. 
 60.  As per my caveat supra note 51, I retain doubts about how to handle the 
unprofitable commercial defendant. 
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D.  Defining Harm, Benefit, and Other Terms of the Provisional Rule 
Before getting into those details, however, let me address some 
definitional issues.  Because in a speech one lacks time to fully explore 
what construals of “harm” and “benefit” might prove most productive for 
discussion, let me stipulate some simple starting points. 
Negative divergence from a baseline is “harm,” and positive divergence 
from a baseline is “benefit.”  As a baseline, I would use the welfare of the 
party in a world where the other person’s action had not occurred.  This is a 
variant of the standard but-for test.  For example:  I am “benefited” when I 
enjoy reading a book another person has written because “but for” the 
action of the author, I would not have the book to read.  (How much I am 
benefited may vary with what my other recreational or reading options 
might have been.)  I cause “harm” if I make a thousand copies of the book 
and give or sell them to people who otherwise would have purchased copies 
from the author’s designated publisher; the author is “harmed” because “but 
for” my actions, the author would have had income from these other 
customers. 
I also need to specify what metric of welfare to use.  Following John 
Stuart Mill, I would not count setbacks to moralizing interests61 as a kind of 
“harm.”  But I would count severe insults to dignity as harm,62 and would 
 
 61. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978) 
(1859) [hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY]; see also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 14–27 
(1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS] distinguishing “harm to others” and 
“offense to others” from paternalistic and other interests).  Regarding moralizing motives 
such as a disapproval of drinking, sexuality, or eating pork, “Neither the intensity of the 
distress nor the number of people who share it seem to affect [Mill’s] conclusion that it is 
illegitimate for the majority to impose its values on the rest of society.” C. L. TEN, Mill’s 
Defence of Liberty, in J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY IN FOCUS 212, 214 (John Gray & G. W. Smith 
eds., 1991).  John Stuart Mill “reject[s] . . . these forms of distress as a proper basis for social 
interference with the liberty of individuals.” Id. at 214.  For analysis of the possible 
distinction between harm and offense, and a probing definitional discussion of “harm,” see 
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra; JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985). 
  Feinberg’s discussion of “benefits” is much less satisfying than his discussion of 
harm. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING:  THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 311–17 (1990).  Among other things, he begins with transfer payments as a type of 
“benefit.” Id. at 312.  By contrast, the primary economic issue for private law is not the 
disposition of fixed monetary amounts, but rather how to encourage A and B to deploy their 
resources in a way that increases the social total.  Feinberg indirectly touches on the latter 
issue in his discussion of collective goods, see id. at 316–17, but the matter lies far from his 
focus. 
 62. I would have to see an extreme dignitary harm before recommending a legal 
response.  The United States would be wrong, I believe, to adopt the European “moral 
rights” approach that puts the authors’ dignitary interests on a pedestal that can impinge on 
free speech rights. We have already gone too far in adopting 17 U.S.C. § 106A. But see 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation:  The Intrinsic Dimension of the 
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006) (arguing for an interestingly 
circumscribed set of moral rights). 
  It is hard for me to imagine what might be a severe enough dignitary harm to warrant 
legal restraint in the copyright arena, where First Amendment free speech doctrine privileges 
most expressions of opinion or emotion that give rise to dignitary and emotional harm. See, 
e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  But I have learned that my 
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count economic injury as “harm.”  I would even count Schumpeterian 
creative destruction as “harm”63—remembering always that harms can be 
outweighed by benefits. (My thought experiment today explores the 
possibility that harmless uses should be free of liability; it at no point 
suggests that all harmful uses should be liable.64)  Most importantly, I want 
to emphasize the importance of the Millian guideline that we should be 
wary of enacting laws that inhibit harmless behavior.65 
E.  Does the Common Law or Lockean Philosophy Pose a Challenge to a 
Rule that Allows Gleaning of Copyrighted Work? 
In addition to setting out these definitional starting points, I want to admit 
a difficulty with the provenance of the gleaning rule:  in ordinary tangible 
property, the common law prohibits even harmless trespasses.  The 
difficulty is not fatal to my project.  After all, as I have argued elsewhere, 
 
imagination is limited in this regard.  Notably, I would have thought that only entries in and 
around the home could cause severe enough dignitary damage to warrant more than nominal 
monetary relief for a physically harmless trespass—until reality taught me differently.  Thus, 
in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 166 (Wis. 1997), punitive damages 
were upheld (appropriately in my view) for a physically harmless trespass not to a home, but 
to a field.  The defendant crossed the plaintiff’s land in a manner that belittled both the 
elderly landowner and the rule of law. 
 63. Creative destruction is ex hypothesi socially beneficial, as far as we can judge from 
the economist who coined the phrase. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 81–86 (5th ed. 2008).  Joseph Schumpeter argues that ordinary competition 
between similar competitors with slightly differentiated products is not the source of much 
consumer benefit.  Rather, monopoly and oligopoly are undercut by the emergence of “the 
new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization” that “strikes [at] . . . the existing firms[’] . . . foundations and their very lives.” 
Id. at 84.  This process, which Schumpeter calls “creative destruction,” “expands output and 
brings down prices.” Id. at 85. 
  For an extension of the Schumpeterian position to copyright, see generally, for 
example, Ariel Katz, Substitution and Schumpeterian Effects over the Lifecycle of 
Copyrighted Works (Aug. 5, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1205679.  For an 
extension of creative destruction to issues of cultural cross-fertilization, see TYLER COWEN, 
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2002). 
 64. Mill took a similar position:  he did not argue that all harmful acts should be 
controlled, only that the social control should be restricted to prohibiting acts that are 
harmful to persons other than the actor. 
 65. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 61, at 73–91.  Mill argued that that “the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” Id. at 9.  Joel Feinberg points out that Mill also 
seemed to contemplate preventing offense to others as an additional rightful basis for 
coercion. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 61, at 14 (citing MILL, supra note 61, at 
9).  The Millian concern has special resonance in the free speech arena, which is copyright’s 
home turf. See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and the First Amendment 
(Univ. of Iowa, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-15, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1367624. 
  In past work, I overstated the irrelevance of Mill to copyright. See Gordon, An 
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1385–86 & n.194 (1989).  Note, however, 
that I still stop short of fully embracing Mill’s harm principle. Inter alia, I believe that some 
harmless uses should give rise to liability (as in the case of the profitable movie 
hypothesized in text). 
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conditional schemes of liability (such as negligence and restitution) are 
better models for the regulation of intangibles than is the real-property tort 
of trespass to land.66  Yet even if one does follow common-law rules of 
trespass, we find analogies that favor changing copyright law to allow most 
harmless use. 
But first, let us look at the challenge the trespass tort seems to pose to my 
provisional gleaning rule.  Under my provisional rule, copyright owners in 
most contexts would be under a duty to allow gleaning.67  In the common-
law system, however, only in cases of emergency is a landowner obligated 
to share her property with others.  For John Locke, a philosopher often cited 
as providing a normative basis for private property, the obligation to share 
one’s property was similarly quite narrow:  in the state of nature, strangers 
were entitled to share in our property only when they were in dire need and 
we had more than enough,68 or where our property would rot without their 
using it.69  This is somewhat surprising for Locke,70 especially given his 
 
 66. See, e.g., Gordon, Harm/Benefit Distinction, supra note 55 (negligence as a model); 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:  Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544–49 (1993) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Self-Expression] (property rights conditional on satisfying the Lockean proviso); 
Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, passim (restitution as a guide for rewriting 
the common law governing misappropriation of intangibles). 
 67.  Note that I assume not only a lack of legal right to exclude in the landowner, but 
also a claim of right to enter in the public.  This follows the Biblical injunction, which not 
only would deprive a landowner of legal rights to stop gleaning, but would also prohibit him 
from erecting fences or using other modes of self-help to exclude gleaners. See supra note 31 
and accompanying text. 
 68. In the First Treatise on Government, John Locke writes, 
But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, that he may 
starve him if he please . . . he has given his needy brother a right to the surplusage 
of his goods . . . . so charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s 
plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist 
otherwise . . . . 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION  29–
30 (bk. I, § 42) (2003); see also id. at 102 (bk. II, §  6). 
 69. Thus Locke writes that one can “acquire a propriety” in wild fruits or beasts, 
but if they perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or 
the venison putrefied, before he could spend it; he offended against the common 
law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share, for 
he had no right, farther than his use . . . .  
Id. at 116 (bk. II, § 37); see also id. (bk. II, § 38) (“The same measures governed the 
possession of land too . . . . [I]f . . . the fruit of his planting perished without gathering[,] . . . 
this part of the earth . . . might be the possession of any other.”). 
 70. It is somewhat surprising that Locke did not see natural law as requiring landowners 
to share when sharing is largely harmless.  Perhaps it was his focus on tangible property, or 
the influence of the common law of his time, that led him in this direction.  It would have 
been more in keeping with his overall theory to have permitted a larger degree of sharing 
than he did:  For Locke, the general duty of persons to refrain from taking the fruit of others’ 
labor, which is the sign of property, derived from the moral imperative to avoid causing 
harm. See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1544–49 (describing “[t]he [h]arm-
based [s]tructure of Locke’s [a]rgument for [p]roperty”).  For the Locke of the Two 
Treatises, therefore, one would imagine that a property invasion would become wrongful 
only when it causes substantial harm.  Thus, it is surprising that Locke gives strangers a 
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religious orientation.  Nevertheless, Locke does not impose on property 
owners a general obligation to allow strangers to glean. 
As for the common law, its miserly approach to sharing might be 
explainable by the tangible nature of its ordinary subject matter.  I do not 
speak merely of the fact that some tangible property can only be shared by 
being destroyed.  (When I share my apple with you, I lose the part you bite 
off.)  Tangible property has a special set of emotional connections as well.  
To invade a physical home is to invade privacy and security.  By contrast, 
as has often been noted, copying a document miles from its author need 
cause the author no distress at all.  Therefore the landowner might be 
entitled to exclude physically harmless trespasses for reasons much less 
applicable to intangibles. 
As for Locke’s reluctance to embrace a broad doctrine of sharing, 
perhaps an explanation lies in the fact that, for Locke, property came into 
being only if it satisfied a stringent moral test, namely, Locke’s proviso that 
the appropriation had to leave “enough, and as good” for others.71  Maybe 
the owners of such specially justified property claims are rightfully subject 
to fewer obligations than are real-life owners, whether of Biblical fields or 
today’s copyrights. 
That is not a question whose merits I reach today, but let’s play with it.  
What if it were true, that fulfilling the proviso by leaving “enough, and as 
good” for others, entitles a property owner to exclude everyone, except for 
the narrow exceptions of dire need and rotting food? 
Then it would be worthwhile to determine which of today’s owners 
satisfy the Lockean proviso.  Exploring that intriguing question will 
indirectly lead us to one of my major qualifications on the “go and glean” 
rule. 
F.  Modifying the “Go and Glean” Rule 
One way to understand Locke’s proviso that the appropriator leave 
“enough, and as good,” is that it imposes a precondition to property.  Before 
a property claim can be the rightful sort that other persons have duties to 
respect, “enough and as good” must be left.  And one way to read “enough 
and as good” is as requiring that the property claimant do no harm by this 
 
liberty to use our property only in case of great need, or on the occasion of our allowing our 
property to rot. 
 71. LOCKE, supra note 68, at 112 (bk. II, § 27) (“For this labour being the 
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once 
joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”). 
  There is immense debate about the proviso, including whether Locke meant it as a 
true precondition to the just acquisition of property, or whether the proviso simply indicated 
an area particularly free of doubt for Locke; what “enough, and as good” should be measured 
against; and so on.  For my own views, see generally Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra 
note 33.  For a particularly intriguing survey of alternatives that emphasizes the many 
possibilities in the word “harm,” see generally John Arthur, Resource Acquisition and Harm, 
17 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 337 (1987). 
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appropriation.72  Therefore, I argue that before a property claim can be 
recognized as valid against a particular person, the property owner must 
show that his claim causes no harm to that other person.73  As part of the 
thought experiment, then, let us assume that today’s copyright owners can 
limit their duties to share only in cases of dire exigency and can refuse to 
allow gleaning—if and only if their property claim itself does no harm to 
the user they are suing. 
When might that occur?  How could a defendant’s paying money to a 
copyright claimant  do no harm to the defendant?  One answer is, when the 
defendant has made a commercial use that can give the property claimant an 
appropriate share, and still leave the defendant as well off as he would have 
been “but for” the lawsuit and “but for” the plaintiff’s creativity.  For the 
defendant to be as well off after losing a lawsuit as he would have been “but 
for” his exposure to plaintiff’s work of authorship, the law would need to 
ensure that the defendant would retain an appropriate profit after paying the 
plaintiff, and that the need for the defendant to anticipate the need to make 
such payment would not interfere with the creative enterprise.  In such a 
case, the proviso is met.74   
 
 72. See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1563–64 (explaining the role of “no 
harm done” in Locke’s response to Sir Robert Filmer); see also LOCKE, supra note 68, at 114 
(bk. II, §  33)  (“Nor was this appropriation . . . any prejudice to any other man, since there 
was still enough, and as good left . . . .  [F]or he that leaves as much as another can make use 
of, does as good as take nothing at all.”). 
 73. Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1570 (“Individualized and Nonfungible 
Nature of the Proviso’s Protection”).  
 74. In other words:  in such a case, awarding relief to the plaintiff will do no harm to the 
defendant. See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, at 205–11, 224–25 (avoiding 
harm to the defendant); see also Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1560–72 
(avoiding harm to defendants’ entitlement to cultural heritage).   
  In some instances, a showing of a profitable bureaucratic or commercial use might 
also satisfy the “harm to plaintiff” requirement:  when a standard profit-making opportunity 
exists, then “but for” the particular defendant, the plaintiff would have had another, similar 
user to whom to license.  This possibility raises issues regarding the appropriate baseline, but 
is intriguing, and is indirectly suggested by Bohannan, supra note 55, especially at 989 
(exploring a two-part test for “harm” in copyright that bears several analogies to this essay’s 
approach). 
  Note that my example of the defendant who can pay a monetary judgment yet 
remain whole contemplates a defendant who has not been affirmatively harmed by exposure 
to the copyrighted work.  When however the work has harmed the defendant, the defendant 
might have a full defense under the self-defense privilege that is honored by some fair use 
cases. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1150, 1153 
(9th Cir. 1986) (minister who was ridiculed in a copyrighted mock advertisement distributed 
thousands of copies of the advertisement to his supporters in an effort to raise money).  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that “the public interest in allowing an 
individual to defend himself against such derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the 
presumption of unfairness.” Id. at 1153.  This self-defense privilege has its parallel in the 
Lockean proviso that property only arises where “enough, and as good” is left for others. 
  An example of how a work can cause harm can be seen in the litigation involving 
Alice Randall, author of The Wind Done Gone.  That novel, an Afro-centric critical sequel to 
Gone with the Wind that was, for a while, banned from store shelves for copyright 
infringement.  Randall stated that she would rather have been “born blind” than have read 
Gone with the Wind.  Such an author’s position in life has been negatively affected by the 
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These conditions are likely to be met when an entity uses copyrighted 
work without consent as part of deliberate large-scale commercial 
enterprise.  Therefore, I suggest that such an enterprise—even if harmless—
should be subject to a “duty not to glean without permission” so long as 
relief is structured to leave the defendant as well off as he would have been 
had he never used the plaintiff’s work. 
This is not so different from the common law after all.  Harmless 
trespasses give rise to significant monetary recovery only in cases of 
significant commercial use.75   
To recap:  if the defendant is making a deliberate use, particularly one 
that involves much forethought and organization,76 there may be a good 
case for allowing the copyright owner to sue even for harmless use of her 
work.  After such a lawsuit, if damages are allocated appropriately, both 
parties should be left benefited—better off than they would have been had 
the other’s actions not occurred.77 
Some propertarians might argue that the courts should allow plaintiffs to 
collect license fees and have an injunction in any case where the defendant 
 
predecessor work.  To forbid Randall the tools necessary to deal fully with the change can 
make her worse off than if she had never encountered the work at all. Wendy J. Gordon, 
Render Copyright unto Caesar:  Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 82 
(2004) [hereinafter Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar]; see SunTrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.), 
and 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (enjoining production, display, distribution, advertising, 
sale, or offer for sale of the book The Wind Done Gone). 
  Note that I am not arguing that a harmed audience member has a legal right to 
redress; such an asserted private right would probably fall to First Amendment scrutiny. See, 
e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 458 U.S. 46, 53, 55–56 (1998) (First Amendment bars 
recognizing a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress by a minister who was 
ridiculed in Hustler magazine).  I am instead arguing for a self-help privilege, a liberty to use 
in self-defense or self-explanation.  This distinction is well established, at least in private 
law.  In the libel literature, for example, one reason for denying public figures strong legal 
rights in defamation is their ability to use publicity to explain themselves.  The First 
Amendment does not limit the latter. 
 75. Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1936) (defendant created a 
tourist attraction conducting tours to a cave that lay partly under plaintiff’s land; the suit 
resulted in giving plaintiff a share of the trespasser’s net profits proportional to the physical 
characteristics and size of the cave being commercially exploited); Raven Red Ash Coal Co. 
v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 239 (Va. 1946) (awarding the market value of the excess use of an 
existing right-of-way as an approximation of the money saved by a trespassing railway). 
 76. For more spontaneous and less bureaucratic creators, the mere need to obtain 
permissions can poison the creative effort. See Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar, 
supra note 74, at 90 (suggesting a special privilege for “context[s] where the use is not 
ordinarily accompanied by pre-use negotiation or licensing”). 
 77. This no-harm result might follow even if the plaintiff is awarded an injunction.  But 
injunctions have dangers, such as giving a plaintiff “hold-out powers” that he or she can use 
to squeeze the defendant. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395–97 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380–84 (1945) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  
  Note that in those cases where the defendant’s efforts produce something the 
copyright owner disapproves of on ideological, religious, or dignitary grounds (e.g., a parody 
of the plaintiff’s work), the fair use doctrine would continue to be available to shelter the 
defendant, vel non, from liability. 
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reaps any benefits at all, so as to facilitate bargaining between the parties.  
But, in the artistic context, where so much depends on “following one’s 
nose” and spontaneity,78 and where the boundaries of prior creators’ claims 
are so indistinct,79 bargaining can be destructive.  This is a kind of market 
failure insufficiently recognized.  Enforcing the plaintiff’s rights too 
strongly may not result in bargaining, but in stalemate.80 
The common law may provide a helpful rebuttal to the propertarians.  I 
know of no case where a harmless trespass for purposes of enjoyment 
resulted in a substantial monetary judgment against the trespassers.  Yet in 
copyright, the statutory damage provision enables record companies to 
collect thousands of dollars from teenagers involved in music copying even 
where no harm is proved.  If the teenagers were entering land or using 
personalty for harmless enjoyment, as Andrew Kull has commented orally, 
“it is virtually inconceivable that restitution law would have this effect.”  In 
trespass cases not involving significant commercial profit, only nominal 
monetary payments are ordinarily recoverable.81   
One might wonder, why are trespass-to-land suits for harmless 
noncommercial entry ever brought?  One purpose of the common law 
allowing suits for such harmless entries is to provide a convenient way to 
try title disputes (“that strip of land is mine,” “no, it’s mine”).  I see such 
nominal-damage suits not as determining that harmless entries are 
“wrongful” but as an administrative convenience.82  I would allow title-
determination suits for copyright as well, but limit recovery to nominal 
damages.  The only copyright owners who would bring suits against this 
kind of (largely profitless, noncommercial) harmless use would be people 
who want clear titles against the possibility of some future harm occurring 
at the defendant’s hands. 
III.  INTERIM CONCLUSION 
One usually imagines that because real property is scarce, its legal rules 
should be stricter against defendants than would be the rules governing 
inexhaustible intangible property.83  If a harmless noncommercial entry to 
land gives rise to no substantial recovery in restitution, then a fortiori, a 
 
 78. See Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar, supra note 74, at 83. 
 79. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273449. 
 80. Cf. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (exploring one set of reasons 
why “rights to exclude” strangers from using creations and discoveries might retard the 
innovation). 
 81.  Although this phenomenon is observable (as a positive matter) and not stated as a 
“rule” by any of the Restatements of Restitution, I believe it a principled statement of 
(normative) law as well. 
 82.  I think I read this proposition in something by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, but 
cannot locate the source. 
 83.  Of course, the supplies leading to the creation of intangibles are not inexhaustible.  
That is one reason why I assume that many harmful erosions of copyright should remain 
actionable. 
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harmless noncommercial use of copyrighted works should give rise to no 
monetary recovery either.84  Similarly, if the law of negligence provides 
copyright a better model than does trespass-to-land, we need to remember 
that negligence law generally forbids suits for carelessness that has caused 
no harm. 
In conclusion, let me sum up how my notion of owners’ obligations to 
share might impact copyright’s treatment of harmless use.  My thought 
experiment suggests that copyright law should give more honor to harmless 
uses—uses that produce results that are Pareto superior to nonuse.  A rule 
we should explore would thus look like the following:  a copyright owner 
cannot sue for substantially harmless uses except in two instances:  (1) the 
copyright owner should be able to obtain a monetary award and an 
injunction85 where (a) the defendant makes a deliberate commercial use of 
the authored work in a context where the defendant is making licensing and 
other bureaucratic arrangements prior to production, and (b) the defendant 
makes enough profit to remain whole after paying the plaintiff; or (2) the 
copyright owner can obtain a nominal monetary award for purposes of 
determining questions of title ownership and title, even against a harmless 
use.  Further, suits even for harmful copying would be potentially 
defeasible (as to any remedy, or as to injunction alone) by a showing of dire 
public need.86 
In other words, I am one of those scholars distressed by copyright’s strict 
and largely nonconditional trespass-like approach to liability.87  I suggest 
 
 84.  There are other places where the law of real property is more generous to the public 
than is copyright.  Thus, for example, many states would give the public liberties to cross 
over privately owned land if necessary to reach publicly owned resources such as beaches.  
By contrast, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. § 4001), 
incorporated into American copyright law, gives the public no liberty to decrypt a digital-
management-device even for the purpose of reaching publicly owned resources; if public-
domain materials are mixed with privately owned copyrighted works behind a digital gate, 
the public has no general privilege to reach them.  Similarly, although the fair use doctrine of 
old-fashioned copyright law would allow a member of the public to reverse engineer a 
copyrighted computer-program work in order to reach public domain material within it, the 
DMCA has no general privilege of fair use.  Thus, if reverse engineering required decrypting 
a technological protection measure, American law would not permit it (unless the Copyright 
Office issued a special ruling.)  It is ironic when real property law is more generous to non-
owners than is the law of intangibles.  For more on this issue, see Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote 
Address: Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903 (2005). 
 85. My remedial suggestions are the most tentative part of this essay.  I have a healthy 
suspicion of how injunctions can be abused, and the danger they pose to free speech, yet I 
fear that monetary-only remedies can erode authors’ intrinsic motivations. Cf. Kwall, supra  
note 62, at 2006–07. 
 86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common-law 
doctrines of “private necessity” and “public necessity,” and Locke’s notion of charity. 
 87. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 55, at 1 (proposing, instead, “a test of ‘foreseeable 
copying’ to limit copyright’s grant of exclusivity to situations where a copier’s use was 
reasonably foreseeable to the creator at the time of creation”); Bohannan, supra note 55, at 
974–76, 983–85 (criticizing the use of trespass-to-land models in copyright); Cristopher M. 
Newman, Infringement as Nuisance (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 
09-17, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354110.  Another model of conditional 
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that a new step be added to the copyright owner’s burden:  she must prove 
either that she has been harmed, or that she is suing simply to clarify title, 
or that the defendant’s use is not the kind that would be substantively 
impaired by a requirement of seeking prior permission.  The last element 
could be demonstrated, for example, by a showing that the defendant is a 
commercial enterprise that made profitable use of the plaintiff’s work and 
was engaged in making licensing and other bureaucratic arrangements prior 
to and during the production process.  If copyright were limited in these 
ways, that might be a first step that might help our community to see more 
clearly the next steps that must be taken to adapt current copyright to 
humanitarian and democratic goals.  
I offer this as a tentative, interim conclusion.  Given the cooperative 
nature of the copyright community, I look forward to learning what comes 
next. 
 
rather than strict liability is restitution.  For an exploration of restitution as a model for 
regulating the copying of intangibles see Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33. 
